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Abstract—Purveyors of malicious network attacks continue
to increase the complexity and the sophistication of their
techniques, and their ability to evade detection continues to
improve as well. Hence, intrusion detection systems must also
evolve to meet these increasingly challenging threats. Machine
learning is often used to support this needed improvement.
However, training a good prediction model can require a large
set of labeled training data. Such datasets are difficult to obtain
because privacy concerns prevent the majority of intrusion
detection agencies from sharing their sensitive data. In this paper,
we propose the use of mimic learning to enable the transfer of
intrusion detection knowledge through a teacher model trained
on private data to a student model. This student model provides
a mean of publicly sharing knowledge extracted from private
data without sharing the data itself. Our results confirm that
the proposed scheme can produce a student intrusion detection
model that mimics the teacher model without requiring access
to the original dataset.
Index Terms—Malware, Mimic learning, Machine learning,
Network intrusion system
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
The Internet has become an essential tool in our daily lives.
It aids people in many areas, such as business, entertainment,
and education [1]. Along with such benefits, however, comes
the ever-present risks of network attacks. Thus, many systems
have been designed to block such attacks. One such danger
is that of malicious software (malware) that can be used by
hackers to compromise a victim’s machines [2]. Millions of
dollars are lost each year because of Ransomware, botnets,
backdoors and Trojans malware. Therefore, network security
is a serious concern, and intrusion detection is a significant
research problem impacting both business and personal net-
works.
This work focuses on intrusion detection systems (IDSs).
IDSs assist network administrators in detecting and preventing
external attacks. That is, the goal of an IDS is to provide a
wall of defense that stops the attacks of online intruders. IDSs
can be used to detect different types of malicious network
communications and computer system usage, better than a
conventional firewall.
Of particular interest to us are anomaly intrusion detection
systems. Such systems are based on the assumption that the
behavior of intruders differs from that of a legitimate user.
One effective technique in anomaly IDS is using machine
learning to detect unusual patterns that could suggest that an
attack is happening. The ultimate goal of these techniques is to
determine whether deviation from the established normal us-
age patterns can be flagged as intrusions [3]. In the literature,
some works apply a single learning techniques, such as neural
networks [4], genetic algorithms, or support vector machines.
Other systems are based on a combination of different learning
techniques, such as hybrid or ensemble techniques.
While machine learning has been widely adopted by
large intrusion detection agencies (IDAs) such as Kaspersky,
McAfee, and Norton [5], some challenges have not yet
been fully addressed. Learning algorithms benefit from large
training sets. However, finding large datasets that contains
well defined malware with the latest up-to-date signature and
zero-day attacks is not an easy task, and typically, it requires a
specialized IDA ( e.g., Kaspersky or McAfee, The lack of such
data in large quantities can result in an inaccurate detection
model because of insufficiently training.
Ideally such agencies could share their data with researchers
working to develop improved detection systems. The private
nature of this data prevents it from being shared, however. One
naïve solution is to allow these agencies to share their predic-
tion models. However, such models are known to implicitly
memorize details from the training data and, thus, inadver-
tently reveal those details during inference [6]. Moreover,
some organizations might use the model to infer sensitive
information about new malware that has been detected. What
is more, that inferred information might be misused to create
new malware. Such risks prevent the IDAs from sharing their
models because of their justifiable concerns regarding keeping
their data private and exposing it to potential intruders or
competiting IDAs.
Recently, the idea of mimic learning has been introduced as
a solution for preserving the privacy of sensitive data. Mimic
learning involves labeling previously unlabeled public data
using models that are trained on the original sensitive data.
After that, a new model is trained on the newly labeled public
data to produce a prediction model that can be shared without
revealing the sensitive data itself or exposing the model that
is directly trained on this data [6]. Therefore, it is suggested,
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
00
91
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
 M
ay
 20
19
mimic learning can enable the transfer of knowledge from
sensitive, private data to a shareable model without putting
the data’s privacy at risk.
B. Related Work
Several schemes have been proposed to study how machine
learning can be used for intrusion detection systems [7].
However, there has been little research on the use of mimic
learning to enable sharing trained models instead of the
original sensitive data as an option for transferring knowledge
[8]. One example of mimic learning research is in the area of
information retrieval (IR), which seeks to effectively identify
which information resources in a collection are relevant to
a specific need or query. In IR applications, having access
to large-scale datasets is essential for designing effective
systems. However, due to the sensitivity of data and privacy
issues, not all researchers have access to such large-scale
datasets for training their models. Motivated by previous chal-
lenges, Dehghani, et al. [9] have proposed a mimic learning
scheme to train a privacy-perserving, shareable model using
weak- and full-supervision techniques [10] on the data. Then,
this trained model can safely transfer knowledge by enabling a
large set of unlabeled data to be labeled, thereby, creating the
needed large-scale datasets without having to share sensitive,
private data.
Unfortunately, current research work has not yet studied the
use of mimic learning in intrusion detection systems.
C. Main Contribution
In this paper, we propose a mimic learning approach that
enables intrusion detection agencies to generate shareable
models that facilitate knowledge transfer among organizations
and research communities. To the best of our knowledge, this
work is the first to examine the use of mimic learning in the
area of intrusion detection.
Thus, the main contribution of this paper is the introduc-
tion and empirical evaluation of a mimic learning scheme
for intrusion detection that effectively transfers knowledge
from an initial labeled dataset to a shareable predictive
model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the system model and the preliminaries. Our
proposed scheme is discussed in details in Section III. The
experimental results are shown in Section IV. Our conclusions
are presented in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we present background material needed to
understand the remaining parts of the paper. This material
includes our assumed network model, our assumed intrusion
detection framework, and an introduction to superised ma-
chine learning.
A. Network Model
As depicted in Figure 1, the assumed network model has
the following entities.
Monitoring  
Module
Feature Extraction  
Module
Classifier
Intrusion Detection  
Agency (IDA)
Intrusion Detection  
Gateway (IDG)
Internet 
Alice
Bob
Figure 1: Illustration for the system model under considera-
tion. Where there is organization with some users and IDS.
On the upper left, there is IDA e.g., Kaspersky, Norton.
• Intrusion Detection Agencies (IDA): IDAs are agencies
such as cybersecurity and anti-virus providers. They are
responsible for developing antivirus, Internet security,
endpoint security, and other cybersecurity products and
services. Examples of IDAs include Kaspersky Labs,
McAfee, and Norton.
• Organizations: Companies, universities, and government
agencies that are connected to the Internet and have the
potential to encounter daily cyber attacks.
• Intrusion Detection Gateway (IDG): IDGs are indepen-
dent entities within each organization that are responsible
for detecting malicious software attacks. An IDG man-
ages the intrusion detection system (IDS) framework.
B. Intrusion Detection Framework
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a system that is
responsible for monitoring, capturing, and analyzing events
occurring in computer systems and networks to detect intru-
sion signals [11]. In this paper, we consider the following IDS
framework that consists of three modules as shown in Fig. 1.
1) Monitoring Module: This module is responsible for mon-
itoring network packets that pass through the network
gateway. In this paper, we implemented this monitoring
module using JnetPcap [12] which is an open source
Java library selected for its excellent packet analysis
performance.
2) Feature Extraction Module: This module is responsible
for extracting the features that describes each connection,
where a connection is defined as the sequence of packets
that flow for some time between a given network source
and destination using a given protocol. For this paper,
a set of 41 statistical features were extracted for each
connection to represent the behavior of each connection
between a given machine inside the monitored network
and a machine outside the network. Statistical features
are chosen to avoid privacy concerns among users as
well as problems associated with encrypted data.
3) Classifier Module. This module is responsible for clas-
sifying a given connection as either benign or malicious
based on the extracted features for that connection.
Supervised machine learning algorithms are used in our
scheme for the task of classification.
C. Machine Learning
Supervised machine learning algorithms take, as input, data
labeled with either a numeric or categorical value and produce
a program or model capable using patterns present in the input
data to guide the labeling of new, previously unseen data. In
this paper, our tasks use a categorical label with a value of
either benign or malicious.
Our work includes the following four machine learning
algorithms for classifying connections as benign or malicious:
decision tree induction (DT), Random Forests (RF), support
vector machines (SVM), and Naïve Bayes (NB). We provide
an overview of each of these algorithms.
• Decision Tree Induction (DT): A decision tree organizes
a hierarchical sequence of questions that lead to a clas-
sification decision. Decision tree induction creates this
tree through a recursive partitioning approach that, at
each step, selects the feature whose values it finds most
useful for predicting labels at that level in the hierarchical
structure, partitions the data according the associated
values, and repeat this process on each of the resulting
nodes until a stopping condition is met. Once built, new
data is classified by using its feature values to guide tree
traversal from the root to a leaf, where a class label is
assigned. At each node, a given feature from the sample
is evaluated to decide which branch is taken along its
path to a leaf. Different algorithms use different criteria
for selection the feature at each node in the tree. As an
example, we look at ID3 [13].
To build the tree, ID3 uses a greedy method that relies
on entropy and information gain (IG) [14] to determine
the best feature at each node as given in Eq. 1.
IG(A,D) = H(D)−
∑
t∈T
p(t)H(t) (1)
where,
H(D) = −
∑
y∈T
p(y)log2p(y) (2)
Where D is the current data set, t is the subset produced
from D after splitting on attribute A, y is the set of
classes, IG(A,D) is the information gain of the system
at attribute A. H(D) is the system entropy, and H(t)
is the entropy of each subset generated as a result of
splitting the set D using attribute A.
• Random Forests (RF): To increase the accuracy and
stability of decision trees, RF leverages a bagging [15]
technique to generate a collection (or forest) of trees.
The label is determined either by averaging the output
decisions in the case of numerical labels or, in the case
of categorical labels, by the class with the maximum
number of “votes” (the class selected by a majority of
the tree in the forest) [16].
• Support Vector Machine (SVM). A SVM [17] is a ma-
chine learning algorithm that attempts to separate points
of data in n-dimensional space using a hyperplane of
n − 1 dimensions. The hyperplane provides the best
separation when the distance of the nearest points to the
plane is maximal for both sides [18]. We include SVMs
because of its scalability and high accuracy in complex
classification problems. [19] [20].
• Naive Bayes (NB). It is a statistical classification method-
ology established on Bayes theorem [21]. It is based on
the assumption that the features of a given sample are
conditionally independent from each other. This assump-
tion enables a tractable calculation of the posterior proba-
bility of class c for a data sample with n attributes. Given
a data X with features Xj = {xj,1, . . . , xj,i, . . . , xj,v},
NB algorithm identifies the maximum posterior proba-
bility distribution P (c|X) as given in Eq. 3.
P (c|X) = P (c)
n∏
i=1
P (xi|c) (3)
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present the proposed scheme, which
has been adapted from the scheme presented in [6]. First,
a classifier is trained on the original sensitive data to produce
a teacher model. Then, the generated teacher model is used
to annotate publicly available unlabeled data and convert it
into labeled data. Next, a new classifier is trained on this
newly labeled data to produce a student model. The proposed
methodology is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
A. Teacher Model Generation
The process of teacher model generation is shown in Fig.
2 where the IDA uses its original sensitive data with a set of
classifiers to generate multiple models, the most accurate of
which is selected as the teacher model.
As depicted in Algorithm 1, the process of generating
the teacher model starts by evaluating several classifiers to
select the classifier with the best performance (see lines 2-
5 in Algorithm 1). The classifier with the best performance
is selected to be the one that is trained on the original
sensitive data to produce the teacher model (see lines 6-7
in Algorithm 1).
B. Student Model Generation
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the process of generating the student
model starts by using the teacher model to label (or annotate)
an unlabeled public dataset to produce newly labeled training
data. After using the teacher model to label the unlabeled
data, a classifier selection and training process, similar to that
used with the teacher model, is used to produce our student
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for the Mimic learning Algorithm
1 function TeacherModelGeneration(Sensitive_Data)
// To generate the teacher model using the original sensitive data
2 C ← {classifier_1, ..., classifier_m}
// Evaluation of m classifiers
3 Best_Classifier ← SelectBest(C, Sensitive_Data)
4 Teacher_Model ← TrainClassifier(Best_Classifier, Sensitive_Data)
5 return Teacher_Model
6 function StudentModelGeneration(Public_labeled_Data)
// To generate the student model using the data being labeled from the teacher model
7 C ← {classifier_1, ..., classifier_n}
// Evaluation of n classifiers
8 Best_Classifier ← SelectBest(C, Public_labeled_Data)
9 Student_Model ← TrainClassifier(Best_Classifier, Public_labeled_Data)
10 return Student_Model
11 function KnowledgeTransfer
// The main function that is responsible for transferring the knowledge from the
sensitive data to the shareable student model using the teacher model
12 Sensitive_Data = GenerateData()
13 TeacherModel = TeacherModelGeneration (Sensitive_Data)
14 Public_labeled_Data = AnnotateData(TeacherModel, UnlabeledPublicData)
15 StudentModel = StudentModelGeneration(Public_labeled_Data)
16 relative_Score_Difference = EvaluateModels(TeacherModel,StudentModel,Test_Data)
17 if relative_Score_Difference < thresholds
18 NetworkIntrusionDetection(StudentModel)
19 end
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Figure 3: Student Model Training process
model. This student model training process can be considered
a knowledge transfer process. The goal is for the knowledge
that the teacher model extracted from the sensitive, private
data to be passed along to the student model through the
publicly available data that the teacher model labeled. This
is illustrated in lines 16-23 in Algorithm 1.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we explain the data and process used to
evaluate our process scheme and present and discussion the
results of this evaluation.
A. Data
A total of 136,000 feature vectors were obtained from
Kaggle’s Open Datasets [22], for the purpose of training and
evaluating our scheme. Each feature vector is described using
41 feature. The dataset contains a combination of benign
and malicious data traffic. The benign data resembles the
behavior of a normal user inside the monitored network. The
malicious data includes the behavior of traffic flows during
different kinds of intrusion attacks (e.g., Denial Of Service
(DOS), Probe, User to Root (U2R), and Remote to User (R2L)
attacks).
A brief explanation of each of these attacks is as follows:
• Denial Of Service (DOS) attack: It is a cybersecurity
attack in which the intruder tries to prevent the normal
usage of the network resources (machines) [23]. In other
words, it tries to overwhelm the resource to prevent them
from being able to serve the requests of legitimate users.
• Probe attack: In this type of attack, the intruder tries to
scan the network computers to search for any vulnera-
bility to exploit it and compromise the system [24].
• User to Root (U2R) attack: The intruder in this attack
tries to exploit the vulnerabilities of a given machine to
gain root access [24].
• Remote to User (R2L) attack: It is a cybersecurity
attack in which the attacker tries to gain an access to
a machine that he/she does not have access to [24].
For the original Kaggle competition, the dataset had a
specific test set. The labels for this test set have since been
released, and for our experiments, we combined all the data
from Kaggle into a single dataset from which different random
data sets could be generated as needed. The obtained dataset
was divided into three parts. The first part is used as the
labeled dataset upon which the teacher model is trained, and it
consisted of 57,900 feature vector. The second part was used
as the unlabeled dataset by deleting the label column from it,
and it consisted of 57,900 unlabeled feature vector. The third
part is the test set. It consisted of 20,173 feature vectors and
constituted the dataset upon which both the teacher and the
student models were evaluated.
B. Experiment Methodology
The training process of the teacher and the student models
pass through several steps that can be summarized in the
following items:
• Step 1: Training the teacher model. The teacher model
is trained offline using a 57,900 feature vector for dif-
ferent network flows representing benign and malicious
data (the labeled data). The classifier set is assumed to
contain the four classifiers mentioned in section II. To
evaluate the performance of each classifier, we use 10-
fold Cross-Validation (CV). k-fold CV is the process of
dividing the training data into k equal folds (parts). After
that, the model is trained on the k−1 folds and evaluated
on the remaining fold. This operation is repeated k times
with each fold being used once as the test data. The k
parameter in our experiments is selected to be 10 [25].
The classifier with the best performance is selected as the
teacher model and is used to label the unlabeled data. The
results of the 10-fold CV are shown in Table I.
• Step 2: Labeling/Annotation process. The unlabeled
data is annotated by the teacher model generated in Step
1. The output of this step is a labeled dataset (57,900
feature vector).
• Step 3: Training the student model. In this step, the
annotated data from Step 2 is used to select and train the
student model. The same four classifiers are evaluated
at this step using 10-fold CV. The classifier with the
best performance is selected as the student model to be
shared.
• Step 4: Teacher/Student model evaluation. In this
step, both the teacher model and the student model
are evaluated using the same test data to compare their
performance.
C. Considered Key Performance Metrics
We define the following key performance metrics used in
our evaluation process:
• Detection Accuracy (ACC): The ratio of the number of
true positives and true negatives over the whole number
of samples.
Accuracy (ACC) =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
, (4)
where TP represents true positives (the number of
malicious samples that are correctly classified as
malicious), TN is the true negatives (the number of
benign samples that are correctly classified as benign),
FP denotes false positives (the number of benign
samples incorrectly classified as malicious), and FN
represents false negatives (the number of malicious
samples incorrectly classified as benign).
• True Positive Rate (TPR): The ratio of the true positives
to the total number of samples that were labeled as
positives
True Positive Rate (TPR) =
TP
TP + FN
(5)
• False Positive Rate (FPR): The ratio of the false positives
to the total number of samples that were labeled as
negatives
False Positive Rate (FPR) =
FP
FP + TN
(6)
• True Negative Rate (TNR): The ratio of the true negatives
to the total number of samples that were labeled as
negatives
True Negative Rate (TNR) =
TN
TN + FP
(7)
• False Negative Rate (FNR): The ratio of the false nega-
tives to the total number of samples that were labeled as
positives
False Negative Rate (FNR) =
FN
FN + TP
(8)
D. Results and Discussion
The results of evaluating the four classifiers using 10-fold
CV for selecting the teacher model are shown in Table I.
We observe that the RF classifier performs better than
other classifiers and that the NB classifier provides the lowest
accuracy. Thus, the RF classifier is selected as the teacher
model.
The 10-fold CV student model results are shown in Table
II. Similarly, the RF classifier performs the best among this
set of classifiers. Thus, it is chosen to be the student model.
Table I: Experimental results for the teacher model
Classifier ACC (%) TPR (%) FPR (%) TNR (%) FNR (%) AUC
DT 99.49 99.40 0.60 99.60 0.40 0.99
RF 99.64 99.50 0.50 99.80 0.20 1.00
SVM 94.26 91.35 8.65 96.75 3.25 0.92
NB 88.10 84.15 15.85 91.60 8.40 0.94
The comparison of both the teacher and the student models
on the test data is shown in Table III. The performance of
Table II: Experimental results for the student model
Classifier ACC (%) TPR (%) FPR (%) TNR (%) FNR (%) AUC
DT 99.63 99.60 0.40 99.65 0.35 0.994
RF 99.83 99.8 0.20 99.90 0.10 1.00
SVM 94.47 91.90 8.10 96.80 3.20 0.923
NB 88.01 85.15 14.85 90.55 9.45 0.939
both the teacher and the student models is nearly identical,
which supports our assertion that unlabeled data trained
by a teacher model can be used to transfer knowledge to
a student model without revealing data that is considered
sensitive. It also suggests that, by sharing student prediction
models, intrusion detection agencies could enable research
communities to benefit from their datasets without directly
sharing that sensitive data.
Table III: Teacher and student model comparison using the
RF classifier.
Model ACC (%) TPR(%) FPR (%) TNR (%) FNR (%) AUC
Teacher 99.66 99.55 0.50 99.73 0.27 1.00
Student 99.59 99.45 0.55 99.71 0.28 0.99
V. CONCLUSIONS
Intrusion detection applications are data hungry and training
an effective model requires a huge amount of labeled data. In
this paper, a knowledge transfer methodology for generating
a shareable intrusion detection model has been presented
to address the problem of enabling the research community
to benefit from datasets owned by the intrusion detection
agencies without directly sharing sensitive data. We believe
that through mimic learning, a network detection student
model can be trained and shared with outside communities
to enable knowledge sharing with fewer privacy concerns.
The performance evaluation for both the student model and
the teacher model show nearly identical performance, which
we consider to be an indication of the success of our mimic
learning technique for transferring the knowledge from the
teacher model to the student model using an unlabeled public
data.
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